Elections in India appear to have become a mechanistic and ritualistic exercise as the country's constitutional and political structures have evolved over time. The reason for this is the establishment and operation of the Election Commission of India (ECI). This has come to light as a result of the Supreme Court hearings on the appointment of Election Commissioners (ECs).

While many issues concerning the ECI have been discussed in court and elsewhere, a closer examination of the ECI may be beneficial, given its role in the country's preservation of democracy.

What Is Election Commission Of India (ECI)?

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is an independent and permanent constitutional body in charge of organising free and fair elections in India's Union and States. The ECI is empowered by the Constitution to direct, supervise, and control elections to Parliament, state legislatures, the office of President of India, and the office of Vice-President of India. The ECI does not handle elections to urban bodies such as Municipalities and Panchayats in the states, so a separate State Election Commission is required.

The Election Commission has been a one-member body since its inception in 1950, with only the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) as its sole member. Later, two more election commissioners were appointed to the body, and the Election Commission became a three-member body. The Chief Election Commissioner and other election commissioners are appointed by the President. The President determines the tenure of office and the terms of service for all commissioners. The chief and the two other election commissioners have the same powers and emoluments as a Supreme Court judge, including salaries. In the event of a disagreement among the three members, the Commission rules by majority vote.

What guides the ECI?

The ECI is established by Article 324 of the Constitution. This brings up the larger issue of how the Constitution works. The provisions to safeguard and ensure the independent and impartial operation of the Election Commission are mentioned in Article 324 of the Indian Constitution.

According to B.R. Ambedkar “However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot. The working of a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution.” 

According to Rajendra Prasad “Whatever the Constitution may or may not provide, the welfare of the country will depend upon the way in which the country is administered. The Constitution, like a machine, is a lifeless thing. It acquires life because of the men who control it. India needs today nothing more than a set of honest men who will have the interest of the country before them.”

Supreme Court on ECI in the last hearing

A set of four public interest lawsuits that were filed beginning in 2015 were before the court in November. Anoop Baranwal, an attorney at the Allahabad High Court, Ashwini Upadhyay, a Bharatiya Janata Party leader well-known for filing numerous cases of public interest, and the Association for Democratic Reforms, a non-governmental organisation that monitors the electoral process, are among the petitioners.

The main claim made by the petitioners is that the current selection procedure for election commissioners is not transparent.

The Union government only gave the idea of the Election Commission's independence lip service, the court observed during the hearings, and the Chief Election Commissioners' terms have been steadily getting shorter.

According to the statement, since 2004, the Center has only chosen candidates who would not serve out their entire six-year term before turning 65, the retirement age for the Union government. The court pointed out that while the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance had eight chief election commissioners in seven years, the United Progressive Alliance, which was led by the Congress, had six in eight years.

What should be a possible overhaul?

A new or existing committee of Parliament should suggest the qualifications and specifications for individuals to be appointed as ECs/CEC.

Two-thirds majority: The committee's recommendations should be presented to Parliament and should only be deemed adopted if two-thirds of the members present and voting do so.

Selection of people: The committee should be tasked with finding and choosing the people who are wanted to be appointed as ECs or CEC.

Recommendations: The committee should submit its suggestions for consideration to Parliament. The committee's recommendations should only be regarded as accepted by the legislature if they receive the support of two-thirds of the lawmakers present and voting.

Presidential approval:They should be sent to the President for approving the appointments.

Age: They should remain in their roles for six years or until they turn 75, whichever comes first.

Removal: Only the impeachment procedure, which is used to remove Supreme Court judges, should be used to remove people who have been so appointed.