In a significant decision delivered this week, Supreme Court of India upheld the current procedures regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) equipped with Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) systems, dismissing several petitions that called for more comprehensive verification of votes and a return to traditional paper ballots.  The bench, comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, addressed concerns surrounding the reliability and integrity of the EVMs, laying down specific guidelines to ensure continued trust in the electoral process. The petitions in question were spearheaded by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), alongside individual petitioners Abhay Bhakchand Chhajed and Arun Kumar Aggarwal. They argued for an increased scrutiny of the voting process through a full count of VVPAT slips and proposed reverting to the use of paper ballots to safeguard the electoral process.  The petitioners expressed concerns about potential vulnerabilities in the electronic voting system that could be exploited to manipulate election outcomes. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, speaking for the court, explicitly stated, “We rejected all pleas related to bringing ballot papers again.” He emphasized the court’s trust in the current system, provided that specific security measures are upheld. In its ruling, the court issued two key directives aimed at enhancing the security and transparency of the EVM process. Post the completion of the symbol loading process, the SLU must be sealed and preserved for a minimum duration of 45 days. This measure is intended to prevent any tampering with the symbols after candidates have finalized their selections.

“The court had prompted the ECI to respond to several technical inquiries concerning EVM operations.  Issues such as the placement and programming of the microcontroller, the availability of Symbol Loading Units, data storage durations, and the specifics of sealing the Control Unit and VVPAT were discussed. An official from the ECI assured the court of the robustness of the electoral system, reinforcing the ECI’s stance that EVMs are impervious to tampering. The court reiterated its limited role in controlling the elections or the functioning of another constitutional authority, underscoring its deference to the expertise and administrative domain of the ECI.”

If requested by a candidate within seven days following the announcement of election results, the burnt memory of the microcontroller in the EVM is to be inspected by a team of engineers. This provision allows for a technical audit of the machines used in the voting process, providing candidates a recourse to verify the integrity of the EVMs used in their respective elections. Justice Khanna also urged the Election Commission of India (ECI) to consider the development of an electronic system to count the paper slips generated by VVPAT units and to examine the feasibility of incorporating a barcode for each party’s symbol on these slips. He outlined the financial implications of these verifications, stating that the expenses should be initially borne by the requesting candidates, but should be refunded if any EVM is found to have been tampered with. Justice Dipankar Datta highlighted the role of trust in the democratic process, commenting, “Blindly distrusting a system can lead to unwarranted suspicions. Democracy is all about maintaining harmony and trust among all the pillars.” He emphasized the need for fostering a culture of trust and collaboration to further strengthen democratic processes.  This perspective underscores the court’s approach to dealing with technological interventions in electoral mechanisms—balancing skepticism with a foundational trust in the systems developed and administered under the ECI’s oversight. During the proceedings, which followed a comprehensive two-day hearing concluded on April 18, the court had prompted the ECI to respond to several technical inquiries concerning EVM operations.  Issues such as the placement and programming of the microcontroller, the availability of Symbol Loading Units, data storage durations, and the specifics of sealing the Control Unit and VVPAT were discussed. An official from the ECI assured the court of the robustness of the electoral system, reinforcing the ECI’s stance that EVMs are impervious to tampering. The court reiterated its limited role in controlling the elections or the functioning of another constitutional authority, underscoring its deference to the expertise and administrative domain of the ECI. As it stands, the verification process involves only five randomly selected EVMs per Assembly segment in a parliamentary constituency.

“EVMs work on their own and don’t need the internet. Sometimes, opposition parties complain about EVMs when they lose. So, the Supreme Court told the Election Commission to add a paper trail to the machines in 2011. This paper trail, called Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), was tested in the 2014 elections and is now used in all elections. They check a small percentage of VVPATs to make sure the results are reliable. The Election Commission says the machines are tamper-proof. Before each election, they test the machines by entering sample votes, and then count them to make sure everything works fine and there’s no cheating.”

The ECI maintains that while EVMs are secure from tampering, full counting of VVPAT slips is not practically feasible given the current technological and administrative frameworks. This stance was challenged earlier in the month when the Supreme Court issued a notice to the ECI concerning a petition advocating for the counting of all VVPAT slips in elections. This petition critiqued the sequential nature of the current VVPAT verification process, arguing that it caused unnecessary delays and proposing simultaneous verification along with the deployment of additional counting officers to potentially streamline the process. This ruling represents a pivotal affirmation of the existing electoral mechanisms and a definitive stance against proposed changes to the current electronic voting infrastructure. By upholding the integrity and feasibility of the ECI’s protocols, the Supreme Court has reinforced the foundational elements of trust and technological advancement in the Indian electoral process. The EVMs, manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited under strict security and technical guidelines, are designed to be standalone, non-networked units, which prevents unauthorized access and tampering.  In the event of any unauthorized attempt to access the microcontroller or memory, an Unauthorized Access Detection Mechanism disables the EVM permanently. Advanced encryption and mutual authentication secure communication between EVM units, ensuring that the voting process remains secure and transparent. The Supreme Court’s decision is a critical step in maintaining the delicate balance between embracing technological advancements in electoral processes and addressing legitimate security concerns raised by stakeholders.  By setting stringent guidelines for the use of EVMs and reinforcing procedural integrity, the court has played a crucial role in bolstering the credibility of India’s democratic processes, ensuring that the electorate’s trust in the electoral system is maintained and strengthened. In India, they use Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) for elections instead of paper ballots. These machines were made by government-owned companies and were introduced gradually starting in the late 1990s. Before EVMs, people voted using paper ballots, which were costly and took a long time to count manually. Also, there was a risk of cheating by filling fake ballots. But EVMs have made things easier and cheaper. They count votes faster and have features to prevent cheating, like security locks and thumbprint verification. EVMs work on their own and don’t need the internet. Sometimes, opposition parties complain about EVMs when they lose. So, the Supreme Court told the Election Commission to add a paper trail to the machines in 2011. This paper trail, called Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), was tested in the 2014 elections and is now used in all elections. They check a small percentage of VVPATs to make sure the results are reliable. The Election Commission says the machines are tamper-proof. Before each election, they test the machines by entering sample votes, and then count them to make sure everything works fine and there’s no cheating.

Kashmir Horizon View:  Expanding on the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) systems, a comprehensive analysis can delve into various aspects. This includes providing a legal and constitutional context, outlining the broader public discourse and stakeholder perspectives, comparing India’s approach with international practices, detailing technical specifications and security features, acknowledging challenges and criticisms, offering reforms and policy recommendations, and discussing the future outlook for electronic voting in India.  By incorporating these elements, a holistic understanding of the court’s decision and its implications for India’s electoral democracy can be achieved.